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EXTENDING THE USE OF CHANCERY POWERS
TO END DEADLOCKS IN REAL ESTATE
BOND FORECLOSURES
IRvING H. FLAMM

T

HE REAL estate bond is of comparatively recent
origin. Until about twenty years ago, the individual
mortgage was the customary security used to finance real
estate. Then, observing the popularity of railroad and
industrial mortgage bonds, underwriters conceived the
idea that the market for real estate mortgages could be
greatly improved by dividing the mortgage into small
units. The trust deeds used in connection with these real
estate bond issues were also patterned after those used
in the large railroad and industrial mortgages. These
real estate bond trust deeds are now passing through
their first real test, and we find them wanting, principally
because the complications involved in the foreclosure of
a fifty thousand dollar issue are almost as great as those
which arise in foreclosing a ten million dollar railroad
mortgage. As a result, the percentage of expense in
foreclosing the small bond issues is disproportionately
high, and this fact has furnished the basis for much
criticism.
Nor is the element of expense the only evil in the
present foreclosure situation. The element of delay is
even more destructive and wasteful. The operation by a
receiver or committee of an apartment building, contain1 Member of Illinois Bar; alumnus of Chicago-Kent College of Law.
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ing, say, twelve or eighteen apartments, can seldom produce the same results as will the operation of the same
property by an interested owner, whose pocketbook is
directly affected by each of the hundreds of different
transactions made annually in the course of the operation of that property. Individual owner management, or
at least owner supervision, is essential if one is to get the
most out of these properties, particularly the smaller
units. Yet, in most of the bond foreclosures which are
to be carried through to a finish, because of the legal obstacles existing under the present procedure, the gap between the default and the expiration of the period of redemption will range, frequently, from three years upward. The loss of net income during the interim must
necessarily be great even if the property is operated by a
reasonably efficient and honest receiver or committee.
An examination of the bond foreclosures filed in 1930
and 1931 will disclose that only a small percentage of
these have been brought to sale. Many of them will not
and cannot be brought to sale under the present method
of foreclosure for many years to come. After the sale,
another fifteen months must elapse before the title can
be put in merchantable condition. In the interim the
property is either insufficiently maintained or the net
income reduced, or both.
The obstacles which must now be overcome before a
sale under decree can be had in a foreclosure involving
scattered bonds are apparent to those lawyers who have
been engaged in that class of work. The bonds in a fifty
thousand dollar issue may be scattered among three hundred bondholders of all nationalities, some unable to
understand English, and most of them unable to comprehend their legal position. Many of the bondholders
are unknown and cannot be located, and others are suspicious and distrustful of anyone who approaches them
for a discussion on the subject. Unfavorable publicity
for some bondholders' committees and bankers has aggravated this condition. Some bonds have come into the
hands of individuals who are merely interested in stirring
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up a nuisance value for themselves. All of these conditions apply in the average case, and in the face of these,
it is well nigh impossible to expect unanimity of action
among the bondholders for any purpose.
When a default occurs in a real estate mortgage, the
ultimate object of the mortgagee (except perhaps in those
exceptional cases in which the mortgagor has independent financial strength) is to enforce the lien of his mortgage by selling the property for the highest price obtainable in order to satisfy his debt out of the proceeds. In
theory, a judicial sale in such a foreclosure suit contemplates'a free sale in the open market to the highest bidder. In practice, we know that this procedure is a sham,
an idle gesture, a mere legal formality. There are no
free buyers at such judicial sales. In fact, there is no
free seller, for the title offered by the master is a qualified
title subject to redemption rights. And so, in practice,
we find that in nearly all of such cases, the complainant
mortgagee, or his nominee, is the sole bidder, and his
bid is usually an arbitrary amount, having little relation
to the value of the property. It is expediently based on
the amount of his mortgage less such deficiency as will
warrant the collection of rents during the redemption
period. No money passes at these sales. The complainant mortgagee, being both the buyer and also the
person entitled to the proceeds of the sale, is able to use
his mortgage in lieu of cash, and the transaction is
completed with little difficulty.
Where, however, three hundred scattered individuals
own the mortgage among them, the situation becomes
extremely complicated. For, if no disinterested bidder
offers anything like a fair price at a sale, and if the
bondholders do not all co-operate in the foreclosure by
bidding in the property for themselves and utilizing
their bonds in payment, no sale can be had. That is the
usual situation today. Where the house of issue is of
high caliber and is still in business, and enjoying the
good will of the bondholders, it takes an active part in
rounding up these bondholders and encouraging deposits
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of bonds with a committee that is given the right to use
them for bidding at the sale. Even in these exceptional
cases it is very difficult to get sufficient co-operation to
carry through the sale. In any event, in the great majority of cases, we have a sort of deadlock, a situation
where the trustee who has commenced the foreclosure as
a representative of the bondholders, cannot proceed to a
sale, because there is no one who will bid in the property,
and he, the trustee, is, presumably, unable to do so on
behalf of the bondholders. Is a court of equity without
power to meet such a situation?
If a committee is functioning, and has, say, eighty per
cent of the bonds under its control, it must, if it should
decide to bid, produce a proportionate share of the bid in
cash for distribution among the other twenty per cent in
addition to the foreclosure expenses. Who is to advance
this money? Bondholders will not make such advances.
The committee often endeavors to raise this money
through a new first mortgage, but here it runs into another snag. It cannot effect a merchantable first mortgage lien even if it should bid in at the master's sale,
because a title so acquired is subject to redemption
rights. There is still another perplexing problem. What
amount shall it bid for the property? If it bids an
amount somewhere close to the face of the mortgage, it
must produce for the minority dissenters a large amount
of cash, and these dissenters would then be faring better
than the bondholders who deposited their bonds under
the advice of the committee. If, on the other hand, it is
to bid an extremely low amount in order to reduce the
cash requirement and to penalize the dissenters, the committee is faced with the possibility of a redemption at a
low price. These perplexing problems are a source of
great annoyance to committees and trustees and they are
in no small way responsible for the misunderstandings
which exist today.
In many of these cases committees are attempting to
solve the problem by buying up the outstanding redemption rights and then, pursuant to a reorganization plan,
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bidding in the property for a small amount, thereby virtually squeezing out non-depositing bondholders. This is
not feasible in the average case, because of the difficulty
in raising the required finances even upon a valid new
first mortgage lien. Moreover, there is a growing tendency by the courts to refuse to confirm sales at extremely inadequate prices, particularly where the dissenting bondholders raise objections to such confirmation. To meet these difficulties many forms of legislation
have been proposed, but because of constitutional restrictions the proposed legislation would be futile. All in all,
the complexities of the situation (now further complicated by the new Federal Securities Act) are such that
many, if not most, of the pending bond foreclosures will
continue to hang on the calendar for years to come, unless
some bold explorations in the field of equity shall prove
fruitful. It is the writer's purpose in this article to suggest a solution from that approach.
A mortgagee who owns an entire defaulted mortgage
against a mortgagor who is insolvent will, if he uses
ordinary prudence and judgment, attempt to get the
benefit of his security with the least expense and delay.
If upon investigation he finds that the aggregate expense
of foreclosing, say, a ten thousand dollar mortgage will
exceed one thousand dollars, and that approximately
two years must intervene before he can acquire good
title, he will, in such case, be wise to offer the mortgagor
a like settlement in cash, or an equivalent participating
interest in the property, and thereby acquire control of
the title by voluntary negotiation. If that is the prudent
course for an individual mortgagee, why should not a
trustee for various shareholders in a mortgage try to
adopt the same course? Such an arrangement, moreover,
assures co-operation by the equity owner who is given an
opportunity to salvage part of his investment. Instead
of destructive receiverships and alienation of tenants,
the management can now be continued in a harmonious
and friendly spirit.
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This principle of adjustment by concession to junior
interests is not new. It is common to the many railroad
and industrial reorganizations which have been worked
out after mortgage defaults. The idea of buying up redemption rights is gaining favor among mortgage bankers and committees. The difficulties in financing have
heretofore been pointed out. But as applied to a real
estate bond issue, the proposal here made is that the
trustee under the trust deed acquire such title by negotiations with the equity owner and junior interests pursuant
to the court's instructions but without the aid of the
judicial sale which now accompanies such transactions.
Obviously, if a trustee can acquire title promptly for the
bondholders by giving up a small participating interest
valued at less than the aggregate cost of foreclosure, he
will be serving the cestui well. In many cases this will
prove to be the only solution of the problem, since foreclosure by judicial sale requires funds for expenses and
for dissenting or unknown bondholders which are not
presently available and may never be available.
In the face of conflicting views among lawyers, it is
not surprising that trustees are timid in voluntarily
conducting negotiations to acquire titles, even when convinced that such transactions are clearly beneficial to
the estates. 2 And so we observe a strange phenomenon,
that of a trustee going through all kinds of useless legal
motions and a prolonged imaginary contest in which the
real purpose is to acquire a title which he might peacefully get at less cost and effort. It does not seem plausible to say that a court of equity is helpless to prevent
such wasted motion and the resultant loss to the estate.
Let us, therefore, assume that a trustee in a representative capacity files a bill to foreclose, (or, in a pending
proceeding, a supplemental bill) setting up the usual al2 See 27 Ill. L. Rev. 849, which contains an interesting article embracing the suggestion that Trustees acquire title for all the bondholders at
the foreclosure sale. See also Nay Aug Lumber Co. v. Scranton Trust Co.,
240 Pa. 500, approving such procedure, and Equitable Trust Co. v. U. S.
Oil and Refining Co., 35 F. (2d) 508, which criticizes the Pennsylvania
opinion.
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legations with respect to the debt, the security, the default, etc., and then adds in substance the following
allegations:
1. that the mortgagor is insolvent;
2. that the equity owner (including junior interests)
has offered to convey clear title to the premises in consideration either (at the option of the Trustee) of a cash
payment of ten per cent of the face of the mortgage, or a
ten per cent participating interest in the property;
3. that the aggregate cost of carrying through such
foreclosure and the losses resulting from necessary delays therein will exceed such amount;
4. that there are numerous circumstances and obstacles which will prevent an expeditious foreclosure, viz.:
5. that the ownership of the mortgage is scattered
among numerous bondholders, many of whom are unknown and cannot be located, and that it is therefore impossible to obtain unanimity of action or consent by
them;
6. that it is very unlikely that anyone will make a
reasonable bid at a foreclosure sale;
7. that in any event no funds are available in the
estate to carry on the foreclosure proceedings;
8. that great delay and irreparable loss to the estate
will result from a failure to enter into such transaction
with the equity owner;
9. that if a sale of the real estate should be deemed
necessary or advisable, or be demanded by any bondholders, such sale could, in any event, be had under the
court's direction to much better advantage after acquiring such title;
10. that a majority of the bondholders, through a
committee, have requested that title .be acquired in their
behalf upon the terms indicated;
11. a prayer for instructions by the court as to
whether to proceed with the foreclosure in the usual man-
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ner, or to acquire title in the manner above indicated, and
thereafter offer the property for sale under the direction of the court.8
It would seem reasonable that under the above allegations, and even if the tenth allegation could not be presented, a court of equity in order to conserve the estate
would have the power to instruct the trustee to acquire
title by voluntary purchase and hold and manage the
property subject to the court's orders, until a sale is
ordered.
Upon the filing of such petition, the court could also enter an order giving all bondholders, or other parties interested, who desire to do so, leave to intervene or file
objections to the proposed purchase of the title. This
order may be based on a principle somewhat akin to the
usual chancery order, fixing a date in which claims or
objections to claims may be filed. Or, in the alternative,
bondholders might be joined as defendants,4 and if unknown, publication had against them as unknown owners.
If any did appear to object to the trustee's proposal, it
is difficult to conceive of any meritorious argument in
support of such objection. In any event, the court, if it
finds the allegations of the bill to be true, (and in most
bond issue foreclosures in Chicago these allegations could
be used) it would seem that the chancellor has the power
and ought to issue instructions that the trustee acquire
title in the manner suggested. In the decree the powers
and duties of the trustee, as well as the method of management, whether by the trustee or by the former equity
owner, or by some reputable management firm, could be
enumerated, and the court would retain jurisdiction of
the matter during the life of the trust. Any cestui que
trust might thereafter make demand for the sale of the
property. Upon such demand being made, the court could
3 See footnotes 10 and 19.
Sees. 24 and 44 of the new Illinois Civil Practice Act, relating respectively to joinder of defendants and joinder of actions, will furnish
greater opportunities to clear away in one proceeding the confusion
created by the divergent objectives of the various bondholders.
4
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thereupon order the trustee to obtain bids for the property or carry on negotiations for its sale, with the same
advantages that are had by an owner having a merchantable title and offering it for sale in the open market.
Incidentally, these sales would ordinarily take place long
before the masters would hold them under the present
foreclosure system.
The following objections are raised to the proposal:
First, such procedure is not contemplated by the trust
deed and would constitute a breaking in upon the trust
by the court; second, the dissenting bondholders
have a contractual right to have their share of the security paid in cash and a judicial sale must be had to fix
their share; third, such procedure deprives the bondholders of the right to enforce the debt against the maker.
These objections are discussed in the order just stated.
The trust created by a bond issue trust deed is an express trust. Who are the cestuis que trust? At first
glance one thinks of the bondholders. Our Supreme
Court, however, has repeatedly indicated that the trustee
holds title not only for the holders of the mortgage bonds,
but for every person who has an interest in the property.5
Consequently, the trustee owes a duty to the equity owner
and to the junior lienors, as well as to all bondholders, to
conserve the trust property. In the face of such duty, it
is clear that a trustee ought to take such steps as will
benefit the estate. But, it is contended, the trustee can
only take those steps which are authorized by the trust
indenture. The usual trust deed authorizes the trustee,
upon default, to take., possession of the property and
operate it until the default is cured, or to foreclose and
sell the property under a decree and distribute the proceeds among those entitled thereto. No express authority is conferred upon the trustee to negotiate for title for
the bondholders, hence the assumption that the trustee
has no such authority. Pomeroy' has stated a familiar
principle as follows:
Gray v. Robertson, 174 1ll. 242; Williamson v. Stone, 128 Ill. 129.
6 3 Pomeroy 's Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 1062.
5
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Trustees in carrying the trust into execution are not confined
to the very letter of the provisions. They have authority to adopt
measures and to do acts which, though not specified in the instrument, are implied in its general direction, and are reasonable
and proper means for making them effectual.
The broad purpose of the trust deed is to realize the
utmost from the security for distribution among the parties in interest. If the most practical way of accomplishing this result is by a procedure not specifically outlined
in the trust deed then why should not a trustee be empowered to adopt such procedure? Assuming the trustee
were offered the redemption rights gratis by an insolvent
maker, would he still be obliged to "foreclose" in the
same manner?
The term foreclosure promptly brings to mind an elaborate judicial proceeding which results in a decree and
a sale. However, there is substantial authority for the
proposition that the term foreclosure as used in our trust
deed implies any act which deprives the mortgagor and
his assigns of their right to redeem. 7 This term has been
held to embrace the voluntary act of the mortgagee in
acquiring title."
It may be added that while the usual form of trust deed
confers no specific authority upon a trustee to acquire
title by voluntary negotiation, even though he may find
such step beneficial, and there is therefore some justification for the trustee's refusal to undertake such responsibility, yet there is nothing in the average trust deed which
prohibits such action. If the trustee's right to "foreclose"
is to be construed in the manner heretofore suggested, it
would seem that he would have the power to acquire
such title by purchase. But as a precautionary measure, 9
7 See 41 C. J. 830, see. 1003.
8 Puffer v. Clark, 7 Allen (Mass.) 80, 85; Lilly v. Palmer, 51 Ill. 331.
9 In Quick, Exec. v. Fisher, 9 N. J. Eq. 802, it was held that although
the trustee may have no power to change the character of the trust
fund, if such change be necessary, it should be made only with the sanction of a court of equity.
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if he presents the facts to a court of equity on a petition
for instructions, he is relieved of his responsibility, when
the court upon a hearing, finds the transaction beneficial
to the estate and instructs him to enter into it. Certainly
the court has power, under its inherent powers over
trusts, to instruct the trustee to adopt a course which
would best serve the estate and all beneficiaries. 10 Indeed
there is even room for the thought that the trustee, knowing that he could benefit the estate by such procedure,
may be held to be derelict in his duties in failing to call
it to the court's attention. 11 A trustee's duty is to comply
with the trust instrument in its true spirit and meaning,
and he should, for that purpose, adopt such measures and
do such acts as are implied in its general direction. It
has often been held that a court of equity may even alter
the trust scheme, upon application of the trustee, where
strict adherence prevents the carrying out of the creator's wishes, and the alteration will aid its accomplishment. 2
In Curtis v. Brown,8 where a similar question arose,
although under different circumstances, the chancellor
ordered a distribution of the trust property in a manner
different from that provided under the trust instrument,
holding that when unforseen exigencies arise, the court
should place itself in the position of the creator of the
trust, and do as he would have desired, if he had anticipated the existing circumstances. The court in refusing
to follow English precedents, pointed out that in England, if a similar emergency arises warranting relief
against the provisions of a trust, Parliament is vested
with the power to afford such relief; that under our
10 Craft v. I. D. & W. Ry. Co., 166 Ill. 580; Strawn et al. Exrs. v.
Trustees of the Jacksonville Female Academy et al., 240 Ill. 111; Longwirth v. Riggs, 123 lI. 258.
11 Cassidy v. Cook, 99 li. 385.
12 Curtis v. Brown, 29 Ill. 201; Gavin v. Curtin, 171 ll. 640; Longwirth
v. Riggs, 123 fli. 258; Packard v. Ill. T. & S. Bank, 261 Ill. 450; Denegre
v. Walker, 214 Ill. 113; Marsh v. Reed, 184 Ill. 263; New*Jersey National
Bank and Trust Co. v. The Lincoln Mortgage and Title Guaranty Co.,
105 N. J. Eq. 557.
13 29 I1. 201.
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constitution the legislature possesses no such power and
since no other tribunal has such power, courts of chancery must exercise it, it being their peculiar province to
afford relief in cases of necessity where other tribunals
lack such power. The court here made the following
observations:
Can it be said that the beneficiary of an estate which would
bring in the market one hundred thousand dollars, should perish
in the street from want, or be sent to the poor-house for support,
or that the estate should be totally lost, because there is no
power in the courts to relieve against the provisions of the instrument creating this trust? Exigencies often arise not contemplated by the party creating the trust, and which, had they
been anticipated, would undoubtedly have been provided for,
where the aid of the court of chancery must be invoked to grant
relief imperatively required; and in such cases the court must,
as far as may be, occupy the place of the party creating the
trust, and do with the fund what he would have dictated had
he anticipated the emergency, ....
Trust estates are peculiarly under the charge of and within the jurisdiction of the court
of chancery. The most familiar instances in which the court
interferes and sets aside some of the express terms of the deed
creating the trust, is in the removal of the trustee for misconduct and the appointment of another in his stead. But this
is as much a violation of the terms of the settlement, as is a
decree to sell the estate and re-invest it, or to apply the proceeds
to the preservation of the estate, or the relief of the cestui que
trust from pinching want. From very necessity a power must
exist somewhere in the community to grant relief in such cases
of absolute necessity, and under our system of jurisprudence,
that power is vested in the court of chancery. This power is
liable to be abused or imprudently exercised, no doubt, and so
may every power vested in the courts or other branches of the
government. The liability to the abuse or misuse of power can
never prove its non-existence, else all powers of government
4
would be at once annihilated.'
After all, if the most practical goal for a mortgagee is
the acquisition of clear title, and then after getting it to
14 29 Ill. 230.
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resell it, why should not equity be empowered to decree
such procedure for the trustee by the shortest and least
expensive route, and often the only route? It might well
be said that the trust deed is silent as to the procedure to
be followed under the contingencies that have now arisen
in most bond issue foreclosures. The trust indenture
provides for a foreclosure and judicial sale, but the machinery for carrying out this provision is not set up. It
is silent as to the procedure to be adopted if, after default, no funds are available to carry on a foreclosure,
or if the bondholders refuse to co-operate with each other
or with the trustee, or if the market is abnormal and no
buyers can be obtained at a fair price. Nor can it be said
that the trust deed anticipates a situation where the mortgagor is insolvent and the equity owner offers to surrender the security on a basis that will serve better to conserve the estate than foreclosure by judicial sale.
The contention that dissenting bondholders have a
contractual right to have their share of the security paid
in cash can be urged only in so far as the trust deed may
provide a process for raising such cash. Since the practical machinery for carrying out a judicial sale is not set
up in the trust deed, in the absence of co-operation by
bondholders and the existence of funds to conduct a foreclosure, equity must step in to aid the helpless trustee.
In such a situation, there is involved the relative equities
of two classes, the majority bondholders as represented
by the committee and the dissenting or indifferent minority. The danger of substantial property loss to the majority should be of greater concern to a court of equity
than the mere technical legal rights of the minority. It
may be noted here that when the positions are reversed
the courts ignore, and properly so, the technical legal
rights of the majority in order to protect the property
interest of the minority. Instances of these are (1) upset
price provisions in decrees and (2) refusal to confirm
sales because of inadequacy of the bid, although both
of these practices may be said to violate the legal rights
of the majority under the provisions of the trust inden-
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ture. The assumption by the court in a foreclosure suit
of the power to pass upon the fairness of a reorganization plan may be regarded as another encroachment upon
technical rights created under the trust deed. In view
of these departures, surely a chancellor should attach
greater importance to the substantial equities of the majority than to the frivolous technical contentions of the
dissenters.
But a more effective answer to this alleged right of
the dissenting bondholder, is that under the procedure
here proposed, the right of such dissenting bondholders
to force a sale which will fix their share, need not be cut
off. On the contrary, not only could such dissenters bring
about a sale, but they could, once a title is acquired by a
trustee, petition for the sale of a merchamtable title to
the property in the open market, instead of going through
the mere subterfuge of a pretended sale as is now the
case.
One who uses common sense and ordinary business prudence will not use a roundabout, cumbersome, and expensive way of getting something he needs when he can accomplish his object in a simple way at much less cost.
The purposes of an equity court would indeed be frustrated if it could not be called upon to conserve trust
property merely because the specific method required is
slightly different from that outlined in the trust indenture. In giving instructions to the trustee to acquire title,
when such course is beneficial to the estate, the court
would be fulfilling the intention of all the beneficiaries
and the creators of the trust. True, the bondholders may
not have anticipated the acquisition of title. Even so the
court has not insisted upon the title being indefinitely
held for the bondholders. It has merely ordered the
acquisition of title in order that great expense and delay
may be avoided, and that such title be put up for sale to
the best advantage, unhampered by defects. By such action the court is merely aiding in the accomplishment of
the purposes of the trust in the most practical manner.
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After acquiring title, if pressure for a sale by a persistent minority should continue, the court could at any
time order a sale held or invite bids, and if the highest
bid should then be grossly inadequate, the court, upon
petition of the majority in interest, could refuse to accept
it, but it might then, as a condition, give to the dissenters
so desiring, certificates of indebtedness based on their
pro rata share of such rejected bid. Thus, each faction
would be getting what it most desires, a share of the
security to the one group and a share of the depressed
market value of the security to the other. Terms and
conditions of payment of the certificates of indebtedness
could be set forth in the court's order, depending on the
existing circumstances. Delays in payment, if any were
required, would work no greater hardship than in any
other creditors' proceeding where the disposition of the
res is delayed for the purpose of conserving the estate.
In creditors' suits against corporations, our Federal
courts have recognized that judicial sales are very often
an evil resulting in substantial injustice either to the
majority or to the minority. In the Phipps case, 15 the
court commenting on such situation said:
. . judicial sales are futile to extract the vice of a failure by a
plan of reorganization and decree to secure to creditors their
equitable shares of the beneficial interests in the reorganized
corporations, and that fact is in itself a persuasive argument that
a plan of reorganization and decree which does adjudge and
secure or offer to the creditors their just and fair shares of the
benefits of the reorganized company, either in its stocks, bonds,
or other securities, is just, fair, and impervious to the attacks
of such creditors, although no judicial sale is adjudged thereby
or made thereunder.
*

The court then proceeds to regard itself as a trustee
holding the trust estate for the benefit of all creditors,
and, with respect to delay in payment, it said:
Nor was it indispensable to such a just result, or to a lawful
decree, that the interest or share of any of the cestuis que trust
15

Phipps v. R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 284 P. 945.
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should be secured or paid to him or it in cash. It was within
the power and the judicial discretion of the court to adjudge
and secure that interest or share to him or it in the stock, bonds,
or other securities of the reorganized company. 16
The foregoing case involved unsecured claims. But does
not a general creditor, in his relation to other general
creditors, stand in the same position as a lien creditor in
his relation to other lien creditors of equal rank? On
that basis the principles applied in the above case might
readily be utilized in mortgage foreclosure suits.
The other objection suggested to this procedure is that
a bondholder is deprived of his contractual right to pursue the maker of the bonds. In view of the court's finding that the maker is insolvent, it would seem that the
rights of the majority should not be subordinated to
such frivolous contentions of the minority. The legal
right to collect against an insolvent maker, particularly
if it be a building corporation, ought not to be permitted
to tie up a trust estate in which the majority of the beneficiaries are willing to ignore such right. Individuals
may, of course, later become solvent; but courts of
equity are even now inclined to relieve mortgagors from
the burden of deficiencies, and thus refuse. to confirm
sales where deficiencies are sought.1 7 In any event, if it
be held in any given case that there is merit to the demand for a deficiency, the court may, upon such demand,
refrain from including any restraining order in its decree
which will bar a dissenter's individual right to pursue the
maker for such amount as he may be entitled to recover.
This would preserve his right to the difference between
his share of the debt and the value of his proportionate
interest in the property acquired by the trustee. The
objection to this is that it may prevent co-operation of
some of those equity owners who are also makers of the
bonds.
It should be noted that the proposal here made, contemplates the action of the court upon a voluntary petition of
16 Citing Northern Paeific R. Co. v. Boyd, 228 U. S. 482, 508.
17 Suring State Bank v. Giese, 246 N. W. 556 (Wis. 1933).
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the trustee for instructions, after the latter has investigated the facts and presented them to the court in the
foreclosure petition, or in a supplemental petition. The
principle underlying such procedure has the stamp of approval of at least one court in a case recently decided. 18
While this suggestion would not be directly applicable
in the cases of racketeering trustees or committees, who,
for selfish reasons, have no desire promptly to work out
an ultimate settlement or reorganization of the property,
yet the court could exercise coercive measures against
these by ordering their removal or, in appropriate cases,
by withholding aid through its power of appointing receivers. In all foreclosure suits where motion for the
appointment of a receiver is made, if it develops upon a
hearing of the motion that the trustee can benefit the estate by acquiring the redemption rights without judicial
decree and sale, and if it shall further appear that the
trustee or the committee has refused to take such course
without good cause, then the chancellor should deny the
motion for a receiver. In such case the complainant
mortgagee is, in effect, saying, "It being my privilege
to do so under the trust deed, I choose to acquire such
redemption rights through a long drawn out and expensive proceeding rather than deal with the equity owners at a saving to the estate." In response a chancellor
might well say, "Perhaps I cannot stop you from foreclosing, but you cannot, under these conditions, induce
me to bring into play my extraordinary power of appointing a receiver to help you carry out your malicious
purpose."
Such an attitude by the courts would undoubtedly frustrate those individuals who have injected
themselves into the picture mainly to serve their own
ends.
The procedure outlined here, if found to be as practicable as the writer believes it to be, would perform a number of useful social and economic functions.
Is New Jersey Nat. Bank, etc. v. Lincoln Mortgage, etc. Co., 105 N.
J. Eq. 557.
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First, it would tend to straighten out the many eii
tanglements in which real estate titles are now involved.
In doing so, real estate as a commodity would be distinctly benefited, and these benefits would inure to a large
class now interested in the ownership of real estate or
real estate securities. In this connection, it is well to
bear in mind that under the procedure here proposed,
registration under the new Federal Securities Act should
be unnecessary, since all the acts of the trustee would be
based upon judicial orders.
Second, it would give a new lease on life to equity
owners, who, under the proposed plan, would be able to
salvage something out of the wreckage created through
no fault on their part. This salvage, often the remains
of a lifetime of savings, would be effected not at the expense of the bondholders, but rather at the expense of
outside interests, who frequently profit most by prolonging the period of foreclosure, or by ultimately perpetuating themselves in control of properties through liquidating or voting trusts, which they have subtly arranged to
suit themselves. Certainly, control by the court over the
trust until a sale is finally had under its direction is more
protective of the bondholders' interest.
Third, this proposal, if adopted, would be extremely
helpful to the Bar as a whole. It would remove the
causes for much of the mud slinging now directed at the
legal profession, including the judiciary. While the
lawyers may not be responsible for the evils now existing,
they owe it as a public duty to exert their best efforts to
cure them. 19
19 An opinion rendered after this article was written, in Straus v.
Chicago Title and Trust Co. by the Appellate Court of Illinois, 1st distriet, (case No. 36806), on Dec. 13, 1933 is additional authority for some
of the views herein contained.

